Sara Roy: Manufacturing Genocide in Gaza + false flags, Afghanistan, more + Rick Warren via Left I on the News

Sara Roy’s important article should not be missed for its clear summary of the humanitarian crisis that U.S/Israeli policy is imposing on a million and a half or more people in Gaza. Here’s the first paragraph.
If Gaza Falls . . .; by Sara Roy


I

srael's siege of Gaza began on 5 November, the day after an Israeli attack inside the strip, no doubt designed finally to undermine the truce between Israel and Hamas established last June. Although both sides had violated the agreement before, this incursion was on a different scale. Hamas responded by firing rockets into Israel and the violence has not abated since then. Israel's siege has two fundamental goals. One is to ensure that the Palestinians there are seen merely as a humanitarian problem, beggars who have no political identity and therefore can have no political claims. The second is to foist Gaza onto Egypt. That is why the Israelis tolerate the hundreds of tunnels between Gaza and Egypt around which an informal but increasingly regulated commercial sector has begun to form. The overwhelming majority of Gazans are impoverished and officially 49.1 per cent are unemployed. In fact the prospect of steady employment is rapidly disappearing for the majority of the population.

Read more:



Published December 23, 2008 by London Review of Books

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As Roy suggests in her first sentence, the mechanism driving the Hamas rocket attacks is clear. To insure that rockets keep coming from Hamas, Israel provokes them by murdering Palestinian activists and civilians. And if one Israeli attack isn’t sufficient, the Israeli attacks just keep coming. When the Hamas rockets finally fall the Israelis have an excuse to close the borders. (I noticed on Link TV that one such rocket displayed by an Israeli official had Hebrew markings.)

Roy’s article also suggests an answer to how the Palestinians obtain at least some of their rockets -- by means of the tunnels to Egypt, the last and unofficial lifeline the Israelis allow and which the Israelis could cut off at any time.

Israel can’t abide Hamas because Hamas has still retained its nationalism, and won’t bow to many of Israel’s demands. That’s why Mahmoud Abbas, president of the PNA, gets an easier ride: because like Arafat before him, he’s a collaborationist. As they did for decades with Arafat, Israel permits or encourages his corruption in return for following their orders.

In a quibble, we could take issue with Roy’s suggestion that Israel’s purpose is to foist Gaza on Egypt. Hardly. Although a Gaza free of Palestinians which they could take over for themselves may be slightly over the horizon, the Israeli leadership requires the continued immiseration of Gaza and the continuation of the rocket attacks for domestic political reasons. While the rockets fall, Palestinian rockets continue to unify and strengthen the Israeli Jewish community behind the dominant and ever increasingly right wing leadership. The rocket attacks push aside domestic demands for reform. All the air is sucked out of any other positive agenda.

If Israel wanted an end to the Hamas rockets, all they’d have to do is suspend their attacks on Palestine. An agreement could be worked out in less than 24 hours. So we have a clear example of manufactured “terrorism.”

The same manufactured terror is largely true with regard to the Bush-Cheney “war on terror” especially in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. For the most part, all the high profile terror attacks starting from the Clinton years, and the fall of the Soviet Union when such attacks had to be manufactured as a substitute to sustain Cold War ideology and U.S. military and intelligence budgets, were the product of Western and Israeli intelligence services. The terror events of 9/11 sit at the pinnacle of such false flag attacks.

The point is there’s no threat to Israel or to the West outside of those they create in order to sustain their military pathology.

One thing that will change with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian crisis when Obama takes over is that Elliot Abrams, the most vicious of the vicious will no longer be in charge of U.S. Middle East policy. But the pressures on Obama will be intense not to take steps to relieve the current genocidal level of starvation and immiseration in Gaza. Any attempt at amelioration by an Obama administration will likely be attacked by the usual Lobby suspects, doubtless with Dershowitz in the lead as giving in to Hamas terror.

Thinking of the Rick Warren debacle (see just below for blogger Left I’s economical screed on the subject), with about 25 days left before inauguration, is it too early to conclude that Obama is constitutionally unable to show any moral courage or leadership? But to realize how scary it’s going to be after Jan 20 all you have to do is say one word: Afghanistan. Everybody knows: current Obama plans for Afghanistan = a failed Obama presidency.

Afghanistan is going to be a failure in part because Obama and his team don’t want to know and are shielding themselves from the knowledge that the U.S. is funding the Taliban to kill NATO soldiers, civilians, Indian engineers, road-builders, schoolteachers, schoolgirls and more through the Pakistani ISI. It’s one of those anomalies that we know and simultaneously don’t know. For example, in a November 25, 2008 interview for NPR's popular Fresh Air program, Terry Gross asked Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid point blank: Isn’t the U.S. funding the Pakistani ISI? It was interesting to hear Rashid try to squirm out of that one.

It can’t be squirmed out of. The U.S. controls not only the major operations of the ISI like the funding and the care and upkeep of the Taliban, and chooses ISI leaders, and directs much of Pakistani policy, but the U.S. also undoubtedly controls also their false flag operations like the Mumbai terror attacks (see Michel Chossudovsky, "India's 9/11. Who was Behind the Mumbai Attacks? Washington is Fostering Political Divisions between India and Pakistan" 2008-11-29, http://globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=11217 )

We know and we don’t want to know. And as we have learned over the decades this is just as true of the Left, as it is the Right.

Why should we expect any better from Obama?

PS. In a bibliographical note, the phrase “Manufactured Terrorism” is the title of a breakthrough article by Gerard Holmgren explaining what really happened on 9/11/01. (See “Manufactured Terrorism – The Truth About Sept 11," (2004, revised 2006).



Holmgren’s title apparently echoes Noam Chomsky’s and Edward Herman’s important Manufactured Consent (1988).

Ronald

***

Blogger Left I on the News on the Rick Warren affair wrote:

12.17 08

Will Rick Warren wake up the liberals?

With every appointment of a war-loving Hillary Clinton/Robert Gates/James Jones or a nuclear power-loving Steven Chu or a Monsanto-loving Tom Vilsack and on and on, liberals keep telling themselves that it's ok, it's just that old "Team of Rivals" thing, and that Barack Obama the supposed antiwar liberal is really the one calling the shots and the others will just be implementing his vision.

And what will they say to the announcement that anti-abortion homophobe Rick Warren will be delivering the invocation at Obama's inauguration? True, it is just "symbolism." One large symbolic slap in the face of every supporter of women's rights and LGBT rights who supported Obama in this election.

Sara Roy's review of a book on Hamas Censored

Don't miss the details below of how Sara Roy's review of a book on Hamas was censored. Yet another instance of Zionist censorship, this time of an article by a highly regarded academic who has written definitive books on life in Gaza and on life for the Palestinians under Israeli occupation.

The interesting thing is that in so many less than high profile cases, an Alan Dershowitz is not required to silence any semblance of an anti-Zionist, or anti Israeli policy, or simply objective position. All that is required in these cases is a pro Israeli faculty member or two to notice that this or that review, this or that associate professor is not good for the Jews, not good for Zionism.

The Zionists have the power, they know they have the power and they know they are free to exercise their power with minimal chance of pushback or consequence. So the niceties of fair play, academic freedom, of speech, don't apply. (Would we do the same thing if we had the power?) The same can be said of the "war on terror."Freedom of speech, due process doesn't apply to those who are perceived as terrorists, enemies, real or imagined of the US and/or Israel, as long as they are Muslims.
Ronald
***>
> BOOK REVIEW
>
> Hamas: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad by
> Matthew Levitt. Yale University Press, in cooperation with the
> Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2006. 324 pages, $26.00,
> hardcover.
>
> Sara Roy
> Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University
> http://mepc.org/journal_vol14/0707_roy.asp
>
> Author's Note:
> This review, published here in its entirety, was originally
> commissioned by The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, the official
> foreign-policy journal at the Fletcher School at Tufts University.
>
> Between the time I was invited to write the review and the time I was
> told it would be published, over two months had passed during which I
> had had several exchanges, some of them difficult, with the editorial
> staff. However, by the end of the process the editor-in-chief, with
> whom I had been working, was pleased with the review, and so was I. He
> sent me an e-PDF of the review as it would appear in the journal
> (Volume 31:1 Winter 2007). The PDF version of the page proofs revealed
> that the editor had excerpted two relevant sentences (featured in
> sidebars) to highlight observations that I had offered in the review:
>
> 1. "While there can be no doubt that, since its inception, Hamas has
> engaged in violence and armed struggle, and has been the primary force
> behind the horrific suicide bombings inside Israel, Levitt's
> presentation reduces this increasingly complex and sophisticated
> organization to an insular, one-dimensional...entity dedicated solely
> to violence...and Israel's destruction."
> 2. "The ability of Hamas to reinterpret itself over time through
> processes of radicalization, de-radicalization, de-militarization, and
> re-radicalization is a pronounced and common theme in its historical
> evolution."
> During a subsequent exchange the editor-in-chief wrote, "Thank you for
> your hard work as well. It's a good review." I believed that was the
> end of the matter. Just a few days later, I received the following
> e-mail message from the same editor-in-chief:
>
> Dear Ms. Roy:
> ?After careful review and much consideration of the merits of your
> piece, we have decided that we are ultimately unable to publish your
> review for this edition. Your review was evaluated by several of our
> editors and an external editor for objectivity. Unfortunately, they
> disagreed with my decision to publish your review for the following
> reasons: despite their agreement with many of your points, all
> reviewers found the piece one-sided. This one-sidedness dissuaded
> readers from reading the piece to the end; ultimately, this last point
> is the most important. Although I found your arguments valuable, if
> readers consistently feel this way, I am unable to move forward with a
> piece. My apologies for the way in which this process was carried out,
> and for the time that you spent on editing the piece. Thank you once
> again for your submission and your efforts. If you would like to
> discuss this further, please feel free to e-mail me.
>
> In more than 20 years of writing and publishing I have never
> experienced such behavior or encountered what to me, at least, is so
> blatant a case of censorship. I am therefore extremely grateful to
> Anne Joyce and Stephen Magro for agreeing to publish the review in
> Middle East Policy.
>
> ===
>
> At the beginning of the first Palestinian uprising, I was living in
> Gaza and spent much time in the refugee camps interviewing families
> about the political and socioeconomic changes taking place around
> them. Despite the harsh living situation, Palestinians were filled
> with a palpable sense of hope and possibility that has since
> evaporated. Hamas was then struggling to create a popular
> constituency, despite overwhelming support among Palestinians for
> secular nationalism. That was 18 years ago, and neither I nor anyone
> else ever thought that Hamas would one day emerge as a major political
> actor: democratically winning legislative elections, defeating the
> majority Fatah party and heading a Palestinian government.
>
> In his recent book, Matthew Levitt, who is deputy assistant secretary
> for intelligence and analysis at the U.S. Department of the Treasury
> and an expert in financial counterterrorism, argues that Hamas is
> strictly a terrorist organization that is not only a domestic threat
> but a global one, a part of an international jihad network with links
> to al-Qaeda that must be met with force. He further argues ? and this
> is the core of his book ? that despite the existence of differentiated
> political, social and military sectors within Hamas, they are all part
> of the same "apparatus of terror."
>
> Levitt devotes significant attention to attacking the Islamist social
> sector (dawa) and Hamas's charitable institutions. It is the principle
> aim of his book to show how Hamas uses its extensive social-service
> network-mosques, schools, kindergartens, orphanages, hospitals,
> clinics, sports clubs, youth clubs-to further its primary political
> agenda, which he claims is the destruction of Israel. He argues that
> through its social support structure and services, "Hamas leverages
> the appreciation (and indebtedness) it earns through social welfare
> activities to garner support ? both political and logistical ? for its
> terrorist activities." Levitt summarizes his argument as follows: "The
> general deprivation of the Palestinian people in the Israeli-occupied
> territories predisposes them to favor the much-needed social support
> that Hamas provides." He continues, "In addition to purchasing
> goodwill, charities also create a built-in logistical support umbrella
> underneath which terrorist operations are sheltered and operate." He
> explains that the dawa network operationally supports terrorism
> through recruitment, employment and financing and by providing
> institutional legitimacy.
>
> His evidence, at times interesting, particularly with regard to
> Hamas's external sources of financing, is more often than not based on
> assumption, extrapolation and generalization. For example, as evidence
> for how religious organizations raise money for Palestinian terrorism,
> Levitt quotes from a pamphlet produced by a Quranic memorization
> center that was sponsored by the Ramallah-al Bireh charity committee.
> The pamphlet listed 30 ways to enter heaven, including "Jihad for the
> sake of Allah by fighting with one's soul and money."
>
> In another example of how hospitals are used to support terrorism,
> Levitt briefly describes the Dar al-Salam Hospital: "According to
> information cited by the FBI," the hospital is considered a Hamas
> institution because it was founded with "Hamas funds and protection."
> But Levitt fails to provide any real evidence of these funds or how
> and why they are considered "Hamas." The assumption is that these
> ties, even if they are shown to exist, are inherently evil and can be
> nothing else.
>
> In a chapter on how the dawa teaches terror and radicalizes
> Palestinian society, Levitt writes, "Recipients of Hamas financial aid
> or social services are less likely to turn down requests from the
> organization such as allowing their homes to serve as safe houses for
> Hamas fugitives, ferrying fugitives, couriering funds or weapons,
> storing and maintaining explosives, and more." He cites as evidence
> for this sweeping statement one resident of Jabalya refugee camp in
> Gaza who fed Hamas militants daily. The possibility that Palestinians
> receive support from Hamas institutions without preconditions or that
> popular support requires more than the lure of financial incentives
> and free social services does not enter Levitt's argument. Levitt also
> claims, "When angry, frustrated or humiliated Palestinians regularly
> listen to sermons in mosques in which Jews, Israelis and even
> Americans are depicted as enemies of Islam and Palestine, Hamas's
> official policy may not restrain individual enthusiasm." One wonders
> how Mr. Levitt knows these things, given that he appears never to have
> stepped inside a Hamas institution in Gaza or the West Bank or to have
> conducted any fieldwork at all.
>
> While these arguments are oft-repeated in today's media, Levitt does
> little to address research that supports a very different conclusion
> regarding the Hamas dawa. Some of the key findings of this research
> point to institutional features that demonstrate no preference for
> religion or politics over other ideologies, particularly in
> programmatic work; an approach to institutional work that advocates
> incrementalism, moderation, order and stability; a philosophical and
> practical desire for productivity and professionalism that shuns
> radical change and emphasizes community development and civic
> restoration over political violence; and no evidence of any formal
> attempt to impose an Islamic model of political, social, legal or
> religious behavior, or to create an alternative Islamic or Islamist
> conception of society.
>
> While there can be no doubt that, since its inception, Hamas has
> engaged in violence and armed struggle and has been the primary force
> behind the horrific suicide bombings inside Israel, Levitt's
> presentation reduces this increasingly complex and sophisticated
> organization to an insular, one-dimensional and seemingly mindless
> entity dedicated solely to violence, terrorism and Israel's
> destruction. To fully understand the current political stature of
> Hamas, it is necessary to closely examine the dramatic transitions
> that have occurred within the organization itself, among Palestinians
> with respect to their society, and in Palestine's relationship with
> Israel.
>
>> From the point of view of Hamas, Palestine is an Arab and Islamic land
> that fell to colonial control with the demise of the Ottoman Empire.
> The establishment of the State of Israel is viewed as a way to
> perpetuate colonial authority over the Muslim homeland and is
> therefore illegitimate. As victims of colonialism, Hamas argues that
> Palestinians have the right to resist and struggle to regain their
> homeland and freedom, viewing this as a local and nationalist
> struggle. Now, almost two decades after its birth, Hamas has grown in
> size and popularity. While changes have not been made to its frame of
> reference or objectives, its political discourse has become more
> refined and streamlined, particularly with regard to its relations
> with local groups, political factions, other religious communities and
> other nations.
>
> Unfortunately, Matthew Levitt's book does not address the critical
> evolutionary processes ? particularly with regard to its
> organizational structure and political, social and economic role in
> Palestinian society ? that have characterized the Palestinian Islamist
> movement and Hamas's rise to power. The ability of Hamas to
> reinterpret itself over time through processes of radicalization,
> de-radicalization, de-militarization and re-radicalization is a
> pronounced and common theme in its historical evolution. Levitt
> neglects to address the significance behind this commitment to
> reinterpretation. His analysis aims simply to demonize Hamas, and he
> discounts the critical connections between changing patterns of
> protest and structures of society, competing visions of a Palestinian
> social and political order, and contesting Islamic and secular
> definitions of meaning and legitimacy. The synergy among these forces
> has characterized the history and growth of Palestinian Islamism.
>
> Israel's military occupation, which has long been the defining context
> for Palestinian life, is almost absent from Levitt's book. Hamas's
> popularity and growing empowerment derive from its role as a
> resistance organization, fighting against an occupation that is now 40
> years old. Israel's steady expropriation, fragmentation and division
> of Palestinian lands; settlement construction and expansion; closure
> restrictions and destruction of the Palestinian economy are not part
> of Levitt's discussion, nor is the right of the Palestinians to resist
> these measures. In those few instances where the occupation is
> mentioned, it is couched in terms that acknowledge Palestinian
> hardship ? a reality exploited by Hamas ? but justified as a response
> to terrorism. In the absence of any serious examination of Israel's
> occupation, Levitt's portrayal of the rise of Hamas is completely
> detached from the context within which it was produced and shaped.
>
> Despite evidence to the contrary, the organization is also described
> as a movement incapable of transformation, ignoring the improvements
> in Hamas's political discourse regarding political compromise with the
> State of Israel and resolution of the conflict. During the period of
> the Oslo peace process, for example, some dramatic changes occurred
> within Hamas. The organization was moving away from the extreme and a
> position of confrontation towards one that was more centrist and
> moderate. This shift was characterized by a reorientation in policy
> and strategic emphasis from political/military action to social works
> and community development. Accompanying this shift was a redefinition
> of the nature of the Palestinian struggle, which was no longer for
> political or military power per se but for defining new social
> arrangements and appropriate cultural and institutional models that
> would meet social needs without resort to violence. Similarly, the
> Islamist movement was not advancing a policy of isolation but was
> calling for greater accommodation and cooperation with both domestic
> and international actors.
>
> Since Hamas's victory in the January 2006 legislative elections, there
> has been a further evolution in its political thinking ? as evidenced
> in some of its key political documents ? characterized by a strong
> emphasis on state-building and programmatic work, greater refinement
> with regard to its position on a two-state solution and the role of
> resistance, and a progressive de-emphasis on religion. (See Khaled
> Hroub, "A `New Hamas' Through Its New Documents," Journal of Palestine
> Studies, 34 (4) (Summer 2006)). These are absent from Levitt's
> discussion. Levitt also overlooks questions that are vital to any
> analysis of Hamas, especially at present. To name just a few, what
> were Hamas's ideological, philosophical and structural boundaries? How
> and why were they reset and expanded? What is the role of religion as
> opposed to politics in Islamist thought and practice, particularly in
> the public sphere? Are religion and politics truly unified? Can Hamas
> reconcile faith and ideology with a demand for a place in the
> political system?
>
> Levitt's book has many serious flaws and merits a detailed critique
> that extends well beyond the scope of this review. His is not a work
> of analysis or scholarship, to say the least, and despite certain
> points that are interesting and accurate, anyone wishing to gain a
> substantive, reasoned and critical understanding of Hamas would do
> well to look elsewhere.
>
> *********************************************************************